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Gerald Schneider and Lars-Erik Cederman
In the mid-1970s, Prime Minister Harold Wilson refused to commit Britain to
European Community (EC) membership during the renegotiations about entry
terms for the United Kingdom.1 Perceiving this position as a "possible threat
with a British exit,"2 German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt did not downplay the
credibility of the British bargaining strategy but rather conceded to Wilson's
demands. Instead of bringing the lone maverick into line, the majority reached
an accord with Britain which, in Schmidt's words, was "by no means cheap for
Germany."3
This agreement is but one of several cases in which the EC has been
blackmailed by one of its members yet managed to overcome the crisis.
Although the community never experienced the permanent exit of one of its
members, strategies of noncommitment significantly have affected the course
of European integration, yielding a process characterized by dramatic shifts.
The stop-and-go pattern of high-level interaction has haunted the EC since its
founding. In the early 1980s the consequent inertia in the EC and its main
member countries was described as "Eurosclerosis."4
This article is a revised version of a paper presented at the 1992 annual meeting of the American
Political Science Association, Chicago, 3-6 September 1992; and the Inaugural Pan-European
Conference of the European Consortium for Political Research Standing Group on International
Relations, Heidelberg, Germany, 16-20 September 1992. We would like to thank Chris Achen,
Douglas Dion, Gary Goertz, John Huber, Michael Nicholson, John Odell, Robert Pahre, George
Tsebelis, the reviewers of this journal, and especially Simon Hug, Cheryl Shanks, and Patricia
Weitsman for their helpful comments. The authors gratefully acknowledge financial support
received from the Swiss National Science Foundation (grant 8210-030615) and the Social Science
Research Council/MacArthur Foundation.
1. This article refers to the history of the EC. However, because the Treaty on European Union
(Maastricht treaty) did not change the logic of the stop-and-go process, our analysis is also valid for
its successor organization, the European Union (EU).
2. Helmut Schmidt, Die Deutschen und ihre Nachbarn (The Germans and their neighbors)
(Berlin: Siedler, 1990), p. 96.
3. Ibid., p. 97.
4. Horst Siebert, The New Economic Landscape in Europe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), p. 1.
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634 International Organization
The predominant theories of international politics address only one side of
the process described above. They emphasize either the failures or the
successes of integration processes but generally fail to provide a comprehensive
explanation of both tendencies simultaneously.5 To account for both the "stop"
and the "go" in regional integration, researchers have to reconcile neorealist
pessimism with liberal optimism. Some authors recently suggested that
compromises between the two paradigms are possible and desirable.6 In this
article, we take a step in the direction of closing this explanatory gap. We argue
that contemporary neorealist and liberal theories pay insufficient attention to
the strategic use of uncertainty in international negotiations. The example
above suggests that European leaders have not shied away from using threats
and other coercive bargaining tactics and that such tactics can have momentous
consequences for the dynamics of integration.
While uncertainty plays a prominent role in both neorealist and liberal
accounts of international cooperation, it has usually been invoked to bolster the
explanations scholars already have committed themselves to. For example,
Kenneth Waltz and Robert Jervis each argue that the fundamental uncertainty
of international anarchy forces states to refrain from integrationist moves.7 On
the other hand, neoliberal institutionalists, such as Robert Keohane, have
highlighted the facilitating effect of international regimes on information flows
and how this helps to promote interstate cooperation.8 Although these
structural arguments are undoubtedly crucial to a proper understanding of
international politics, they fail to address the micro-level of diplomatic
negotiations. This article attempts to build a bridge between the neorealist and
liberal arguments by exploiting recent advances in information economics.9
5. See for instance Andrew Moravcsik, "Negotiating the Single European Act: National
Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community," in Robert O. Keohane and
Stanley Hoffmann, eds., The New European Community, Decisionmaking and Institutional Change
(Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1991), pp. 41-84; Wayne Sandholtz and John Zysman, "1992:
Recasting the European Bargain," World Politics 42 (October 1989), pp. 95-128; and Geoffrey
Garrett, "International Cooperation and Institutional Choice: The European Community's
Internal Market," International Organization 46 (Spring 1992), pp. 533-60.
6. Emerson M. S. Niou and Peter C. Ordeshook make this point in " 'Less Filling, Tastes Great':
The Realist-Neoliberal Debate," World Politics 46 (January 1994), pp. 209-34. For similar
statements see Andrew Moravcsik, "Liberalism and International Relations Theory," The Center
for International Affairs working paper no. 92-6, Harvard University; Joseph Nye, "Neorealism
and Neoliberalism," World Politics 40 (January 1988), pp. 235-51.
7. See Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley,
1979); and Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," World Politics 30 (January
1978), pp. 167-214.
8. Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984).
9. Spence's pioneering work on uncertainty in labor markets laid the foundation for this type of
modeling; see Michael Spence, Market Signaling (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1974). Recent advances in noncooperative game theory introduced powerful tools to study
signaling in social situations. For a technical introduction, see Jeffrey Banks, Signaling Games in
Political Science (Chur, Switzerland: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1991). In political science,
such models have been most successfully applied to legislative bargaining and deterrence theory.
For a comprehensive analysis of the former, see Keith Krehbiel, Information and Legislative
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These models show how uncertainty may influence the bargaining outcome.
Typically, some actors, assumed to possess "private information," exploit this
asymmetry in order to obtain a favorable solution. This gives "weak" actors an
incentive to mimic their stronger counterparts. Such bluffs force strong types to
distinguish themselves by issuing costly signals that may ultimately lead to
suboptimal outcomes.10
In accordance with functionalist theories, our models assume that all actors
prefer some degree of further integration. However, unlike the liberal
paradigm, we study the effects of disagreements concerning the precise level of
cooperation. In particular, we examine situations involving an "integrationist"
government or coalition of governments and a "laggard" state. This obstruction-
ist member is also interested in deepening formal cooperation but prefers a
more modest outcome to the ambitious option preferred by the integrationist
side. The formal framework demonstrates that, even under liberal assump-
tions, strategic manipulation under uncertainty might lead to neorealist
outcomes such as the breakdown of negotiations. The integration process can
reach an impasse after the laggard's use of threats. Such manipulations become
possible because of private information about the cost of exiting the organiza-
tion (the "exit game"), about the ratification process (the "ratification game"),
or about the likelihood of the obstructionist government losing domestic power
to a less integration-friendly opposition (the "takeover game"). Our results
highlight the importance of uncertainty in such situations. Under complete
information, functionalist predictions are upheld: the integration process
proceeds, although the precise level of integration depends on the credibility of
the laggard's threat. If information is more unevenly spread, however,
stalemate may follow despite all governments' wish to find an agreement.
We do not argue that these three models elucidate all aspects of integration
negotiations. The analysis pertains to the summit negotiations of the European
Council.11 Nor do we claim that strategic uncertainty exhausts the sources of
incomplete knowledge in international politics.12 Yet, our rational choice
approach captures the counterintuitive effects of information asymmetries and
puts the study of international bargaining on a more solid analytic footing. It
Organization (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991) on the latter, see Robert Powell,
Nuclear Deterrence Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
10. See for instance James D. Fearon, "Deterrence and the Spiral Model: The Role of Costly
Signals in Crisis Bargaining," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political
Science Association, San Francisco, 30 August-2 September 1990.
11. Though this article is specifically addressed to European Council summits, our theory is
potentially useful for other types of summit meetings, such as those analyzed by Robert D. Putnam
and Nicholas Bayne, Hanging Together: Cooperation and Conflict in the Seven-Power Summits, rev.
ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987).
12. For the analysis of "analytic uncertainty," see Keisuke Iida, "Analytic Uncertainty and
International Cooperation: Theory and Application to International Economic Policy Coordina-
tion," International Studies Quarterly 37 (December 1993), pp. 431-57.
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636 International Organization
helps to overcome the tendency in regional integration research to bias
examinations in favor of breakthroughs or deadlock situations.13
The article is organized as follows: the next section presents the puzzle of
this article, the stops and starts in European cooperation. The third section
discusses possible analytic solutions to the stop-and-go problem in regional
integration. Our three models are presented in the fourth section. Finally, the
conclusion sums up the findings and points to avenues of future research.
Technical details can be found in the appendix.
Stops and starts in the history of European integration
EC integration proceedings have oscillated between short-lived euphoria and
agonizingly protracted stalemates. Institutional development has thus been
rather unpredictable. Since stalemates historically have been largely a conse-
quence of disagreement over the level of cooperation, we will focus on conflicts
that have arisen during crucial summits of the organization. Our limited
information models show that the manipulation of uncertainty during the
summit meetings of the European Council is a major cause of the stop-and-go
logic of the integration process. The European Council as the "board of
directors"14 for the overall organization has become so important that Simon
Bulmer and Wolfgang Wessels describe the development of the EC in the
1970s and 1980s as the history of the council summits.15 Even before the
establishment of the European Council in 1975, no major agreement was
possible without the consent of all members.16 Consequently, an institutional
equivalent to the council has existed since the creation of the EC.17
The structure of the summit meetings enables the laggard state to blackmail
the other members. Threats are possible as long as the integrationist side
prefers a solution including the laggard over an agreement that excludes the
obstructionist member. We assume that the bargaining space at the crucial
summit meetings is unidimensional and consists of two possible treaties,
13. This argument is in line with Christopher H. Achen and Duncan Snidal, "Rational
Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Study," World Politics 41 (January 1989), pp. 43-69.
14. Stephen George, Politics and Policy in the European Community (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1985), p. 13.
15. Simon Bulmer and Wolfgang Wessels, The European Council: Decision-making in European
Politics (London: Macmillan, 1987), p. 2. This is the most informative study of the European
Council from a literature that is mainly descriptive. For the impressionistic observations of two civil
servants who participated in several summits, see Michael Butler, Europe: More than a Continent
(London: Heinemann, 1986); and Marcell von Donat, Das ist der Gipfel! Die EG-Regierungschefs
unter sich (This is the summit! The EC heads of government among themselves) (Baden-Baden,
Germany: Nomos, 1987).
16. The European Council was formally established by a declaration at the 1974 Paris summit
meeting.
17. Few procedures other than meeting twice a year govern the unanimously ruled council
meetings. Until 1985, the European Council met three times a year. At special occasions, the
council convenes at short notice (e.g., after the breakdown of the Berlin Wall). For a description
see Butler, Europe, p. 80.
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implying either "more" or "less" integration.18 The difference between the two
agreements is qualitative, representing the absence or presence of an impor-
tant indivisible integration feature such as the creation of a common currency.
Compromises between the modest option (the "Less treaty") and its integra-
tionist alternative (dubbed the "More treaty") are excluded because of the
actors' domestic commitment to their preferred position prior to the negotia-
tions. While the laggard declares a preference for the Less treaty over the More
treaty, the integrationist government opts for the More treaty.
The maverick can launch three different threats to preserve sovereignty: first,
it can threaten to leave the organization (full exit threat) or some area of
cooperation (partial exit threat). Second, the laggard may claim that its
domestic constituents will reject the treaty unless the modest integration
project is adopted (ratification threat). Third, obstructionist governments are
able to exploit the possibility of a takeover by an allegedly less integration-
minded opposition (takeover threat). The integrationist can counter these
demands by threatening to move ahead without the constrained government
(exclusion threat).
Because of such manipulations the summit negotiations of the European
Council can produce different outcomes. While the Less and More treaties
represent different levels of deepening formal cooperation, the issue of
widening (or narrowing) also enters the calculations.19 Implementation of an
exit threat would result in an integration failure implying deepening at the
expense of narrowing integration. If the threat concerns a full exit, integration
failure results in the formal withdrawal of one member state. "Partial
integration failures" happen if the integrationist majority pushes ahead by
signing the More treaty despite the refusal of the laggard to accept the entire
treaty. In this case, the latter state is granted an exception from the contested
legislation. Though it is possible that the laggard will later sign the full treaty,
this arrangement threatens to create a Europe a deux vitesses (two-tier Europe).
When the other members believe that a threat by the obstructionist state is
credible, the Less treaty is accepted. This implies the adoption of modest
progress or the preservation of the status quo in the event that the laggard is
not interested in deepening the formal cooperation. The manipulation of
uncertainty may also lead to an integration breakthrough because the ambi-
tious governments can point to the laggard's incredibility and force the
obstructionist member to give in to their far-reaching project.
18. The assumption of unidimensionality isjustified as long as no side-payment is large enough to
appease the laggard. In other words, issue linkage is possible for minor decisions. Such
multidimensional problems are discussed in Leon Lindberg, "Political Integration as a Multidimen-
sional Phenomenon," International Organization 24 (Autumn 1970), pp. 694-731.
19. On widening versus deepening see Helen Wallace, "Widening and Deepening: The
European Community and the New European Agenda," Royal Institute for International Affairs
(RIIA) discussion paper no. 23, RIAA, London, 1989; and Anna Michalski and Helen Wallace,
The European Community: The Challenge of Enlargement (London: Royal Institute of International
Affairs, 1992).
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TABLE l. Crucial stop-and-go events in the history of the
European Community (EC)
Year
1963/68
1965
1975
1978
1979-84
1984
1991
1992
Laggard
France
France
Britain
Britain
Britain
Britain
Britain
Denmark
Less treaty
No enlargement
of the EC
Preservation of
veto right
Renegotiations
No European
Monetary System
Renegotiations on
budget
Only Internal
Market
No European
social policy
Maastricht with
opt outs
More treaty
Enlargement of
the EC
Empowerment of
commission
Acceptance of
original treaty
European Monetary
System
No renegotiations
on budget
Single European
Act and Internal
Market
Social policy part
of Maastricht
Maastricht without
opt outs
Laggard's
threat
Full exit
Full exit
Exit/
ratification
Partial exit
Full exit
Partial exit
Takeover
Ratification
Outcome
Stalemate
(Less treaty)
Stalemate
(Less treaty)
Stalemate
(Less treaty)
Breakthrough with
partial exit
Stalemate
(Less treaty)
Breakthrough
Breakthrough with
partial exit
Modest progress
(Less treaty)
Since no member country ever formally left the EC, it may seem that threats
have played no important role in the history of the organization. Nonetheless,
there is ample evidence to the contrary.20 Table 1 offers a nonexhaustive list of
the most important changes in the process of European integration.21 Our
analysis identifies the laggard and the year during which the threat was issued.
Further, the table identifies the two main options at stake, the nature of the
threat and the negotiation outcome.
The most famous instance of an exit threat is the "empty chair" episode. To
block an institutional reform proposed by the European Commission, French
20. In international organizations other than the European Union, there are important cases
where the exit threat was executed (e.g., France's exit from the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion's military activities and the walkout by Britain and the United States from specialized agencies
of the United Nations such as the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organiza-
tion). In his pathbreaking study, Hirschmann refers to several examples of exit from economic
organizations in the United States. See Albert O. Hirschmann, Exit, Voice and Loyalty (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 27-29.
21. The selected cases also refer to situations where the laggard did not favor an increase in
integration. Our models, however, exclude this contradiction to the liberal explanation. This means
that our results are biased in favor of the optimist account of European integration. Early studies
analyze some of the same events. Lindberg and Scheingold develop a "fever chart" to describe the
ups and downs in the institutional development of the organization; see Leon N. Lindberg and
Stuart A. Scheingold, Europe's Would-be Polity: Patterns of Change in the European Community
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1971), p. 104. For an early ad hoc model explaining both
integrative and disintegrative moves, see Joseph Nye, Peace in Parts (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971),
chap. 3.
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President Charles de Gaulle withdrew from participation in EC intergovernmen-
tal decision making from July to December 1965. This maneuver contributed to
the other governments' accepting the Luxembourg compromise, which perpetu-
ated the practice of unanimous voting for crucial decisions. In 1963 and 1968,
de Gaulle employed the same tactic when he single-handedly kept Britain out
of the organization.
Some progress was made in the early 1970s with the entry of Denmark,
Ireland, and Britain. This enlargement, however, provoked another crisis
stemming from blackmailing by a laggard member. We have already described
how British Prime Minister Wilson successfully applied an exit threat during
the renegotiations of entry terms for the United Kingdom in the mid-1970s.
This strategy was not successful during the negotiations over the establishment
of the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1978. France and Germany used
the countermove of threatening to exclude Britain completely from the new
regime. The laggard's position was influenced by fear that the loss of
sovereignty implied by participation in the EMS would lead to a considerable
devaluation of the British pound.22
Margaret Thatcher's ascension to power in Britain was concomitant with
seemingly endless struggle about the EC budget. At the Dublin summit
meeting in December 1979, the new British Prime Minister asked for a
substantial reduction of Britain's contribution. To make her demands more
convincing, she refused to agree upon a future meeting. The European Council
could not resolve the dispute, and Prime Minister Thatcher did not concede to
another summit "until literally the last five minutes," according to Chancellor
Schmidt.23 The status quo dominated in the early 1980s, succeeding from Prime
Minister Thatcher's continued insistence on getting "our money back."24
The EC was revitalized by the Internal Market Program and the Single
European Act (SEA) as well as with the adhesion of Portugal and Spain. After
Prime Minister Thatcher had attained a more favorable settlement for the
British contribution to the EC, her threats became progressively less credible.
As Andrew Moravcsik convincingly points out, this strategy was not compelling
in the negotiations over the SEA.25 Thatcher had to retreat from her opposition
to majority voting in internal market affairs because France and Germany used
the threat of excluding the United Kingdom from the treaty. The weakening of
veto power in the Council of Ministers was the most important consequence of
the SEA. The British insistence on less integration also failed during the
negotiations on the Treaty on European Union. Prime Minister John Major
tried to raise the fear of a takeover by an anti-integrationist faction within the
Conservative Party. However, he could only opt out partially from a most
22. Schmidt, Die Deutschen und ihre Nachbarn, p. 145.
23. Helmut Schmidt is quoted in Hugo Young, One of us (London: Macmillan, 1989), p. 187.
24. The phrase is Thatcher's; see Butler, Europe, p. 95.
25. Moravcsik, "Negotiating the Single European Act," p. 68.
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640 International Organization
significant ingredient of this last breakthrough: the implementation of a
European social policy.26
The unexpected rejection of the Maastricht agreement by Denmark in 1992
spawned the most recent period of stagnation. The initial rejection of the
Treaty on European Union made the bargaining position of the Danish
government very strong. In the renegotiations, the EC granted some major
exceptions to its Scandinavian member to assure that the population would
vote yes in the second attempt. This example shows that even a small laggard
can successfully threaten the rest of the organization.
Explaining the stop-and-go pattern in European integration
In spite of the rocky history of European integration, most studies focus on
either the achievements or setbacks of this process. The two dominating
paradigms in international relations, neorealism and liberalism, cannot ac-
count for the "stop" and the "go" portions simultaneously. On the contrary,
they claim that only one of these outcomes is possible. Neorealists believe that
political integration is not feasible because of diverging state interests. Waltz
used the relative gains argument to show why cooperation between states is so
infrequent: "A state worries about a division of possible gains that may favor
others more than itself."27 Structural realism predicts that the anarchical
character of the international system and the resulting "self-help system" will
inhibit any attempt to strengthen the ties between nations. Stalemate and even
conflict would thus be the dominant features of European interactions.
This "impossibility hypothesis" lies in sharp contrast to the predictions of
liberalism, which has been the more influential paradigm in integration
research. Especially its neofunctionalist strand continues to shape the field
sixty years after the publication of David Mitrany's The Progress of International
Government.28 This persistence is evident in frequent allusions to "spillover
effects," "supranationalism," and other traditional concepts. According to the
general argument of functionalism, the presence of a systemic attribute
(explanandum) can be explained in terms of its beneficial consequences
(explanans) for the system.29 While functionalist reasoning has played an
important role in sociological and anthropological theory, this trend has not
escaped criticism.30 Typically, objections address the static character and
26. Richard Corbett, "The Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union," Journal of
Common Market Studies 30 (September 1993), pp. 271-98.
27. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 106.
28. David Mitrany, The Progress of International Government (New Haven, Conn.: Yale
University Press, 1933).
29. David Little, Varieties of Social Explanation: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Social
Science (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1991), chap. 5.
30. For examples of classical sociological theory, see Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social
Action (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1937) and The Social System (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1951); and
Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (New York: Free Press, 1963). For a
sophisticated extension within the Parsonian tradition, see Niklas Luhmann, Soziale Systeme:
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collectivist perspective of functionalist theories31 or their lack of a convincing
evolutionary mechanism.32
In international relations, functionalist arguments have been employed to
explain cooperative behavior. The approach suggests that states participate in
international governmental organizations mainly because of technological
advances and the steadily growing demands of their constituents to improve the
standard of living.33 Borrowing from liberal trade theory, functionalism sees
integration as a "demand-driven" outflow of social pressures. This interpreta-
tion is also manifest in Ernst Haas's theoretical elaboration.34 In that approach,
regional integration necessarily progresses under the condition that states
prefer to intensify their cooperation; "if the actors, on the basis of their
interest-inspired perceptions, desire to adapt integration lessons learned in one
context to a new situation, the lesson will be generalized."35 In other words,
integration evolves gradually, with the cooperation spilling over from one
decision-making function to another.36
Studies of regional integration rely on both neorealist and liberal ap-
proaches. Empirically, the ups and downs of the European integration process
sharply contradict the two competing accounts of whether or not interstate
cooperation is possible. According to neorealism, successful integration is
hardly likely in the long run. Most critics agree that the liberal approach fails to
explain why the intensification of political integration proceeds in a discontinu-
ous manner despite converging interests.37 De Gaulle's ability to reinvigorate
Grundriss einer Allgemeinen Theorie (Social systems: Ground plan of a general theory), (Frankfurt
am Main: Suhrkamp, 1984). See also Paul Colomy, ed., Functionalist Sociology: Classic Statements
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1990); and Paul Colomy, ed., Neofunctionalist Sociology: Contempo-
rary Statement (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1990).
31. John Harsanyi, "Rational Choice Models of Political Behavior Versus Functionalist and
Conformist Theories," World Politics 21 (July 1969), pp. 513-38.
32. Jon Elster, Explaining Technical Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
Little aptly summarizes these objections: "Functional explanations are suspect in social science.
. . . In particular, they must be supplemented by detailed accounts of the social processes through
which the needs of social and economic systems influence other social processes to elicit responses
that satisfy those needs." See Little, Varieties of Social Explanations, p. 102.
33. Compare Harold K. Jacobson, William M. Reisinger, and Todd Mathers, "National
Entanglements in International Governmental Organizations," American Political Science Review
80 (March 1986), p. 142. See also the discussion of economic process explanations in Robert O.
Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1977), pp. 38^2 .
34. See Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economical Forces 1950-1957
(London: Stevens and Sons, 1958); and Ernst B. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and
International Organization (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1964).
35. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State, p. 48; italics original.
36. Quasi-functionalist thinking is nowadays present in some strands of neoinstitutional
economics. For a discussion, see Jack Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.:
Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 40.
37. See, for instance, Lindberg and Scheingold, Europe's Would-be Polity. For a recent summary
of the literature, see Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, eds., The New European
Community, Decisionmaking, and Institutional Change (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1991).
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the veto right invited sharp criticism by realist thinkers38 and sparked
modifications to the explanations supplied by functionalists.39 However, in the
words of Fritz Scharpf, theoretical developments since the 1960s have only
increased the "several varieties of ad hoc explanations."40
Although scholars have once again become interested in regional integration
since the mid-1980s, most studies focus on either the achievements or setbacks
in this form of cooperation. No consensus has emerged on why the most
significant developments occurred.41 The literature addressing the Internal
Market Program and the SEA offers explanations that disagree on the role of
supranational institutions and transnational interest groups. According to a
more holistic understanding of integration set forth by Wayne Sandholtz and
John Zysman, Europe's revival is due to "a complex web of intergovernmental
bargains and accommodations among various national business elites."42 While
not completely denying the importance of government strategies, these authors
stress the impact of changes in the international economic environment. In
contrast, Moravcsik interpreted the SEA as the result of "intergovernmental
institutionalism."43 By describing the interests of states as the "primary source
of integration," he rejected the claim that "supranational" variables (i.e., the
momentum of European institutions and/or the activity of transnational
interest groups or international leadership) account for "the timing, content
and process of negotiating the SEA."44 David Cameron prudently concludes
that "the 1992 initiative was the product of a complex interaction among
several economic, institutional, and political factors, some of which were
integrationist and other intergovernmental."45
A similar debate also appears to be emerging over the most recent
development in the European integration process, the Maastricht agreement.
According to one point of view, this treaty is to a large extent a timely reaction
to systemic constraints, in particular the loss of autonomy following increased
global integration of financial markets.46 A conflicting hypothesis postulates
38. Stanley Hoffmann, "Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of
Western Europe," Daedalus 95 (Summer 1966), pp. 862-915.
39. Lindberg and Scheingold, Europe's Would-be Polity.
40. Fritz W. Scharpf, "The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and
European Integration," Public Administration 66 (Fall 1988), pp. 239-78.
41. Ernst B. Haas's "Turbulent Fields and the Theory of Regional Integration," International
Organization 30 (Spring 1976), pp. 173-212, marked the end of the first wave of integration
research. See also Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie, "International Organization: A
State of the Art on an Art of the State," International Organization 40 (Autumn 1986), pp. 753-75.
42. Sandholtz and Zysman, "1992," p. 127.
43. Moravcsik, "Negotiating the Single European Act."
44. See ibid., pp. 75 and 67, respectively.
45. David R. Cameron, "The 1992 Initiative: Causes and Consequences," in Alberta M. Sbragia,
ed., Euro-politics, Institutions, and Policymaking in the "New" European Community (Washington,
D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1992), p. 65.
46. David M. Andrews, "Germany, Maastricht, and EMU: The Limits of Integration Theory,"
paper presented at the annual convention of the International Studies Association, Atlanta, Ga.,
31 March-4 April 1992. See also Wayne Sandholtz, "Choosing Union: Monetary Politics and
Maastricht," International Organization 47 (Winter 1993), pp. 1—39.
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that spillover effects and political leadership were central moving forces behind
this achievement.47
Since the history of integration leading up to today's European Union is
characterized by a stop-and-go pattern, case study research focusing exclusively
on either progress or setbacks addresses only half of the story. A more accurate
integration theory must allow for both successes and failures. We propose
models that help to elucidate both types of outcomes. Before presenting our
limited information games, it is useful to provide an inventory of alternative
approaches that also promise to account for the variance between the realist
and liberal extremes. While these contributions undoubtedly are of great value
in accounting for regional integration processes, they fall short of a complete
explanation of the stop-and-go pattern in European integration.
There are, roughly speaking, four alternative explanations to account for the
shifts in European integration. First, it is possible to assume that a new actor
might be powerful enough to enact a new policy. This interpretation links the
shifts in interstate cooperation to events such as government changes, which
are largely exogenous to the integration process.48 (A variant of this explana-
tion emphasizes the unexpected reactions by domestic constituents once the
summit is over. The first Danish referendum on the Maastricht treaty showed
that ratification increasingly influences the course of European integration.49)
However, this article tries to explore whether or not endogenous factors are
also at work. In other words, we attempt to show that some characteristics of
the summitry itself contribute to the stop-and-go logic.
A second way of explaining change attributes different outcomes to varia-
tions in the economic environment. An expanding economy and equally
distributed growth would thus make an agreement easier while economic
turmoil would have severe repercussions for the integration process. In
contradiction to this theory, some setbacks—such as the failed enlargements of
the 1960s—have occurred during periods of economic success: integration
crises are not necessarily linked to growing economic disparities or different
growth rates.50
A third research area focuses on possible endogenous factors and relies on
the concept of iterated games. Various game-theoretic Folk theorems51 and
47. Finn Laursen, "Toward European Political Union: An Analysis of the Intergovernmental
Conference on Political Union," paper presented at the annual convention of the International
Studies Association, Atlanta, Ga., 31 March-4 April 1992.
48. Garrett, "International Cooperation and Institutional Choice."
49. See Gerald Schneider, "Getting Closer at Different Speeds: Strategic Interaction in
Widening European Integration," in Pierre Allan and Christian Schmidt, eds., Game Theory and
International Relations (Cheltenham, England: Edward Elgar, 1994), pp. 125-55; and Gerald
Schneider and Patricia A. Weitsman, "The Punishment Trap: Integration Referendums as
Popularity Contests," typescript, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva.
50. William Wallace, "Less than a Federation, More than a Regime: The Community as a
Political System," in Helen Wallace, William Wallace, and Carol Webb, eds., Policy Making in the
European Community (Chichester, England: John Wiley and Sons, 1977), pp. 403-36.
51. See, for instance, Robert Aumann, "Survey of Repeated Games," in Robert Aumann, ed.,
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especially Robert Axelrod's The Evolution of Cooperation have shown that the
infinite repetition of such well-known games like the prisoners' dilemma can
include both cooperative and conflictual outcomes.52 Empirical illustrations to
support these models refer to situations like the cold war, where the two
antagonistic powers do not know the result of their interactions in a more or
less stable strategic context. This view contrasts with the reality of the meetings
of the European Council, which were held in a more fluid surrounding. Since
domestic concerns often influence decision makers on such occasions, it seems
appropriate to model these summits as events governed by a shortened time
horizon rather than as an infinite succession of similarly structured interac-
tions.
The fourth possibility is that the actors themselves develop new interests
through learning and adaptation. This hypothesis is very important in liberal
thinking. Drawing on Haas's work, Sandholtz links learning to problems
requiring coordinated action: "Policy preferences change as decision-makers
acquire increased technical understanding of the problem."53 Duncan Snidal's
recent studies on game transformations offer a framework that could be used to
analyze learning.54 Although these models do not directly address the disputed
issue of how the game itself alters preferences, they show the importance of
variations in payoff orders.55 Cooperative outcomes are only impossible if states
find themselves in a prisoners' dilemma or if they care very much about the
gains of the other side. Although this modeling approach may be very useful for
refuting some orthodoxies of neorealism, it does not fully capture the dynamics
of EC summitry since it does not explicitly address the intricacies of strategic
bargaining.56
Essays in Game Theory and Mathematical Economics in Honor of Oscar Morgenstern (Mannheim,
Germany: Bibliographisches Institut, 1981), pp. 11^2; Drew Fudenberg and Eric Maskin, "The
Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting and with Incomplete Information,"
Econometrica 54 (May 1986), pp. 533-64; or Eric Van Damme, Stability and Perfection of Nash
Equilibria (Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 1987).
52. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984). See also
Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and
Institutions," in Kenneth A. Oye, ed., Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1986), pp. 226-54.
53. Wayne Sandholtz, High-tech Europe: The Politics of International Cooperation (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1992), p. 30.
54. See Duncan Snidal, "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation,"
American Political Science Review 85 (September 1991), pp. 701-26; and Duncan Snidal,
"International Cooperation Among Relative Gain Maximizers," International Studies Quarterly 35
(December 1991), pp. 387-402.
55. For an example of the viewpoint that there is no such thing as self-induced changes of taste,
see George J. Stigler and Gary S. Becker, "De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum," American
Economic Review 67 (March 1977), pp. 76-90. See also Carl Christian von Weizacker, "Notes on
Endogenous Change of Tastes," Journal of Economic Theory 3 (December 1971), pp. 345-72.
Summaries of this literature include Jon Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and
Irrationality (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1979); and Gerald Schneider, Time,
Planning, and Policymaking: An Evaluation of a Complex Relationship (Bern: Peter Lang, 1991).
56. For the original argument on relative gain-seeking, see Waltz, Theory of International Politics.
For a game-theoretic formulation of the concept, see Joseph M. Grieco, Cooperation Among
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Our argument about the role of strategic threats naturally hinges upon the
presence of exploitable information asymmetries. It may seem that the
manipulation of uncertainty plays a less central role in negotiations among
Western democracies outside the security issue-area. However, our assumption
that private information comes into play in negotiations over nonmilitary
matters is based on two observations: first, if the actors were able to foresee the
bargaining outcome, there would be no need to engage in cumbersome
negotiations in the first place. For example, the case of the renegotiations
about the entry terms for Britain cited earlier shows that Chancellor Schmidt
was not sure whether Prime Minister Wilson's exit threat was credible or not.
This uncertainty forced actors into the bargaining process. Second, the home
government normally enjoys an informational advantage because of its control
of domestic politics; it does not have to reveal how it will influence public
attitudes toward the international treaty if a referendum is required. In
representative democracies, policymakers can also keep quiet about future
side-payments with which they intend to garner the support of skeptical
legislators. This second argument shows that informational asymmetries are
largely due to power asymmetries.57 The concept of two-level games recently
has facilitated the study of domestically determined differences in bargaining
strength in a more rigorous fashion.58
This is not to say that leaders are always perfectly informed about their own
polities. Summarizing the findings of a major empirical study, Peter Evans finds
that leaders "did try to strategically misrepresent their own polities, but not as
often as expected, and with much less success."59 Moravcsik goes even further
in cautioning that "among modern information-rich democracies, it is ex-
tremely difficult for negotiators to mask their true domestic win-set, even in a
sensitive area of national security like weapons procurement."60 On the other
hand, there is a rich literature documenting a similar use of unequally
distributed information even within Western democracies. The exploitation of
Nations: Europe, America, and Non-tariff Barriers of Trade (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,
1990).
57. This point has also been made by Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict, pp. 142-45.
58. For the original argument, see Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The
Logic of Two-level Games," International Organization 42 (Summer 1988), pp. 427-60. Critical
extensions are presented in Fredrick W. Mayer, "Managing Domestic Differences in International
Negotiations: The Strategic Use of Internal Side-payments," International Organization 46
(Autumn 1992), pp. 793-818; and Keisuke Iida, "When and How Do Domestic Constraints
Matter? Two-level Games with Uncertainty," Journal of Conflict Resolution 37 (September 1993),
pp. 403-26.
59. Peter B. Evans, "Building an Integrative Approach to International and Domestic Politics:
Reflections and Projections," in Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam,
Double-edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1993), pp. 397-430; the quotation is drawn from p. 409.
60. Andrew Moravcsik, "Armaments Among Allies: European Weapons Collaboration, 1975-
1985," in Evans, Jacobson, and Putnam, Double-edged Diplomacy, pp. 128-67; the quotation is
drawn from p. 159.
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private information by legislative committees constitutes one particularly
well-studied example.61
On balance, we conclude that the issue of incomplete information bargaining
remains an open empirical question. Though we do not aspire to settle this
debate, we hope that the cases drawn from European integration will shed
additional light on the frequency and feasibility of information-based political
strategies. As Keohane writes: "The significance of asymmetrical information
and quality uncertainty in theories of market failure . . . calls attention to the
importance not only of international regimes but also variations in the degree
of closure of different states' decisionmaking processes."62
The laggard against the rest
The exit game
One obstacle to smoother increases in EC integration comprises threats by a
state with minimalist preferences to exit from the community. To return to the
first example, Prime Minister Wilson threatened to withdraw from the EC to
obtain better terms for Britain in negotiations with more integration-friendly
members. To see why an exit threat must lead to minimal agreements,
negotiation stalemate, or actual exits, consider our first model, which we term
the "exit game." This model assumes two players, which is an accurate
representation of EC bargaining at the level of the European Council as long as
unanimous approval is required to increase integration. Furthermore, in
accordance with functionalist theory, the model assumes that both sides prefer
to increase integration. We postulate, however, that they disagree as to the
treaty's target level. In our notation, the laggard favors a more modest increase
(the Less treaty), while the integrationist prefers a more ambitious project (the
More treaty). Because the exit game involves uncertainty, the integrationist is
unsure whether it is encountering a strong laggard who can credibly threaten to
exit or a weak laggard without credibility.
Figure 1 illustrates the players' preferences graphically. The laggard's and
the integrationist's utility functions, denoted C/j and U2, respectively, vary with
the treaty's integration level. The main difference between the two curves is
that the laggard's preferred outcome is less ambitious than the integrationist's.
This implies that the laggard receives less from the More treaty (payoff mx)
than from the Less treaty (payoff /j); that is, lx < m^. The integrationist's
preferences are reversed (l2 > m2). The utility functions reflect the two
governments' domestic support. Popular governments have flat curves since
they are less sensitive to summits' outcome than less popular governments. The
payoff differences mi - li and m2 — l2 measure governments' sensitivity.
In addition to the two treaties, there are outside options. The laggard's
strength influences how it views the consequences of an exit. After it executes
61. See, for example, Keith Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organization.
62. Keohane, After Hegemony, p. 94.
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Laggard's
utility
Integrationist's
utility
\
Extent of integration
FIGURE l. Deciding about more or less integration with exit options, where U, =
the laggard's utility function; U2 = the integrationist's utility function; Upartial = the
integrationist's utility function for a treaty without the laggard; ej = the laggard's
exit payoff; e2 = the integrationist's exclusion payoff; m2 and m2 = the laggard's
and the integrationist's respective utility derived from a More treaty; I; and l2 = the
laggard's and the integrationist's respective utility derived from a Less treaty; 8 =
the strong laggard's offsetting gain after executing its exit threat; and c = audience
costs for backing down from the exit threat
its threat, the weak laggard receives the exit payoff e,. By contrast, the strong
laggard evaluates this outcome more positively and obtains ex plus an offsetting
gain 5. However, the obstructionist member of the organization still considers
this payoff inferior to both treaties. To make the exit threat credible, the
laggard needs to convince its opponent that backing down is too costly for itself.
The obstructionist can achieve this by committing itself domestically to the
preferred Less treaty. Backing down from this commitment would incur a
domestic "audience cost" c to the laggard, yielding the payoff mt — c which
may or may not be worse than exit.63 Due to the strong laggard's tougher
preferences (^ + 8 > mx - c), it has a credible threat whereas its weaker
counterpart does not (mj — c > et).
The functionalist assumption of integration-friendliness implies that the
laggard would rather accept any treaty than exit. The exception to this rule is
the strong laggard's reluctance to lose face domestically. On a theoretical level,
63. Fearon, "Deterrence and the Spiral Model."
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Exit,
Demand M,
Demand L
SL
ey + 8,
my - c,
Accept M
FIGURE 2. The exit game, where N = Nature; SL = strong laggard; WL = weak
laggard; I — integrationist; p = I's prior belief of encountering a strong laggard; L =
Less treaty; and M = More treaty (for definitions of other variables, see Figure 1)
this exception corresponds to the realist preoccupation with credibility. Like
the laggard, the integrationist prefers both treaties to the former government's
execution of the exit threat (payoff e2). This means that the integrationist can
never credibly threaten to exclude the laggard from an agreement (e2 < h <
m2). This preference is illustrated by shifting the integrationist's utility curve
downward (compare £/2partiai> the utility obtained for a partial integration
treaty without the laggard member).
To summarize, we assume the following preference orders.
ASSUMPTION 1. <?; < m, - c < et + 8 < m; < //
ASSUMPTION 2. e2 < l2 < m2
Incomplete information game theory offers an elegant way to model
uncertainty.64 Figure 2 formalizes the strategic situation as a game tree with two
main branches. We let a fictive player, Nature (labeled N in the figure) make
64. We employ the Harsanyi transformation to study this interaction as a situation of incomplete
information. For an introduction to this technique, see Eric Rasmussen, Games and Information
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), pp. 54-60.
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the first move. If Nature chooses the upper branch, the laggard is strong (SL);
otherwise, the laggard is weak (WL). Lacking information about Nature's
move, the integrationist government (I) does not know which type of laggard it
is playing against (thus, the dashed line connecting the two branches). The
integrationist, however, observes the laggard's first move and may use this
information to deduce the latter player's type. In this first move, the laggard
can either immediately accept the More treaty (Accept M) or demand the Less
treaty (Demand L). If it demands the Less treaty, the integrationist responds by
either accepting the laggard's offer (Accept L) or insisting on the More treaty
(Demand M). In the event that the integrationist rejects the Less treaty, the
laggard confronts a trade-off between losing face (Back down) or leaving the
organization (Exit). Given assumption 1, it is clear that the strong laggard exits
and the weak one gives in.
If there were no information asymmetry—if each player had complete
information about the opponent's preferences—then the weak laggard would
never attempt to bluff, and the two would always reach agreement on one or the
other treaty. In other words, the liberal interpretation of political cooperation
would be accurate in a world of certainty, since the Pareto-inferior exit option
would never materialize. Proposition 1 summarizes this case more formally.65
PROPOSITION 1. Under complete information, the exit game has two integration
equilibria. Equilibrium 1: If the integrationist is certain to encounter a weak laggard
(p = 0), the negotiations result in the More treaty. Equilibrium 2: If the integration-
ist is certain to encounter a strong laggard (p = 1), the negotiations result in a Less
treaty.
The proposition shows that, in the case of complete information, integration
develops according to the functionalist account. If both sides intend to intensify
their formal links, they can always reach an agreement, be it an ambitious More
treaty or a humble Less treaty. The summitry negotiations are always efficient
because the weak laggard never attempts to bluff. The strong laggard, by
contrast, can successfully make an "irrevocable commitment" and squeeze the
range of outcomes down to the Less treaty. This result is equivalent with
Thomas Schelling's finding that constraints, or "the power to bind oneself," are
an important source of bargaining power.66
Once we drop the certainty assumption, integration bargaining becomes
much more complex. Going back to the full game specification, let us assume
that the laggard has private information about its own preferences.67 The
integrationist does thus not know whether it is dealing with a strong type or a
65. For a technical statement and proofs of all propositions, please see the appendix.
66. Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1960), pp. 21-52.
67. This simplifying assumption could be relaxed by introducing double-sided incomplete
information. It is likely that similar results hold for this more general case.
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weak type. This kind of asymmetry opens the door for bluffs and forces the strong
laggard to distinguish itself from its weak counterpart by issuing the exit threat.
If the integrationist thinks it is unlikely to face the strong laggard, it will
sometimes call the weak laggard's bluff. But the insistence on the More treaty
may also provoke an exit in the case that the laggard happens to be strong.
Thus, up to a certain point, the integrationist will find it worthwhile to engage
in risky bargaining. If this player is more confident that it is encountering a
tough opponent, however, it will immediately give in and accept the Less treaty.
The second proposition reports on these results.
PROPOSITION 2. Under incomplete information, the exit game has two major
equilibria. Equilibrium 1: Up to a certain threshold belief p0 = (m2 - h) I (m2 - e2),
the strong laggard always demands the Less treaty, which is sometimes accepted.
This implies either exit or the Less treaty. The weak laggard, however, randomizes
the first move between accepting the More treaty and demanding the Less treaty. In
the latter case, the integrationist also randomizes its strategy, producing the Less
treaty or the backing down outcome. Equilibrium 2: Beyond the threshold belief
p0, both the weak and the strong laggard always demand the Less treaty, which is
immediately accepted by the integrationist.
This second proposition establishes that characteristics of the negotiation
process itself contribute to the stop-and-go pattern in European integration.
Our endogenous explanation of the change in the direction of political
cooperation casts doubt on the liberal hypothesis that reduces integration to a
coordination problem. However, the structural realist view that setbacks are
the norm of regional integration is not justified either. Cooperation can evolve,
but it is not a necessary development. The first game particularly shows that
backlashes are possible despite all governments' desire to further the integra-
tion process. Exits take place when the integrationist misperceives the identity
of the laggard. The integrationist's insistence on the More treaty forces the
strong laggard to leave the organization. This mistake, which occurs only in the
first equilibrium, produces a Pareto-inferior outcome. The second proposition
also reveals that bluffing constitutes a salient aspect of integration negotiations
under uncertainty. Traditional integration theory ignores such strategic manipu-
lations.
We can use the deductive framework of the exit game to isolate the impact of
key variables. Because it is the most interesting case, we focus on the first
equilibrium of proposition 2.68 Table 2 displays how changes in the laggard's
signaling cost and domestic sensitivity as well as the integrationist's preference
for the laggard's exit affect the likelihood of the different outcomes.69
Examples from the most crucial summit meetings illustrate our deductions.
68. Such a deduction of hypotheses is not applicable to the other equilibria of the exit game,
since the outcome of each is unique.
69. The comparative statics results are derived by partially differentiating the outcome
probabilities with respect to each parameter. See the appendix for details.
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TABLE 2. The effect of key parameters on the likelihood of the outcomes
of the exit game3
Laggard's Laggard's sensitivity Integrationist's
Outcome signaling costs (c) to popularity (It - mj) exclusion payoff (e2)
More treaty 0 0 +
Backdown - + —
Less treaty + - -
Exit - + 0
aA plus sign indicates a positive effect; a minus sign, a negative effect; and zero, no effect.
The different hypotheses are not tested quantitatively; such an endeavor would
most likely lead to unreliable results, given the difficulties in measuring some of
our concepts. In other words, this article is geared toward theory development
rather than extensive testing of existing theories.70
As expected, the likelihood of an exit diminishes with increasing signaling
costs c. Hence, integration in the form of the More treaty or the Less treaty
outcomes becomes more likely when the laggard is able to commit itself
strongly to the Less treaty. Prime Minister Thatcher was willing to pay these
costs and to take the risk of isolating Britain internationally. Lord Carrington,
Thatcher's Foreign Minister, writes retrospectively: "she had a strong—and
entirely justified—feeling that Britain was the victim of deplorable inequity;
and she was not temperamentally averse from showing the British people at
home that when it came to outfacing foreigners she was in the first league."71
The comparative statics show that it always pays the integrationist to
convince the laggard that the integrationist's "outside option" is highly attrac-
tive. If the integrationist is able to raise its payoff e2 for excluding the laggard,
the More treaty becomes more probable at the expense of the Less treaty. To
give an example for the tension between full and partial integration, France
and Germany managed to convince Prime Minister James Callaghan that their
payoff for excluding Britain from the exchange rate mechanism of the EMS was
very high. Knowing this, Callaghan could not block France and Germany from
striking their own deal. Commenting upon the negotiations, he writes in his
memoirs that "there seemed little doubt that France and Germany would go
ahead even if Britain did not join and their joint decision would almost
automatically bring Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg into the scheme."72
Callaghan's negotiating position was weakened further by Ireland's decision to
participate fully in the monetary regime. Giscard d'Estaing comments that
70. A similar modeling approach has been outlined by Morris Fiorina, "Formal Models in
Political Science," American Journal of Political Science 19 (February 1975), pp. 133-59.
71. Lord Carrington, Reflect on Things Past (London: Collins, 1988), p. 319.
72. James Callaghan, Time and Chance (London: Collins, 1987), pp. 492-93.
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Callaghan's face hardened into "obstinacy" after the Irish defection.73 British
negotiators finally kept out of the exchange rate mechanism, thus assuring a
"soft landing" of not being completely excluded from the EMS.74 President
Giscard d'Estaing and Chancellor Schmidt also were successful in November
1979 when they tried to convince Prime Minister Thatcher to accept their
counteroffer during the EC budget crisis. Christopher Tugendhat writes, "As
the vehemence of her arguments increased, Schmidt at one point feigned sleep,
and when she refused to give in, the French party's cars were drawn up outside
with their engines revving in order to emphasize the take-it-or-leave-it nature
of what was an offer."75 British insistence was unsuccessful. Margaret Thatcher
finally gave in and asked for only a temporal extension to "save her face."76
Nevertheless, this defeat did not prevent Prime Minister Thatcher from raising
similar demands at subsequent summits.
Table 2 also demonstrates how the sensitivity to considerations of popularity
influences the likelihood of different negotiation outcomes. The less popular a
laggard, the more important is the separation between the two treaties. Change
from the More treaty to the Less treaty is linked to a considerable utility gain
for a government under domestic pressure. Since the utility function is steep,
the difference l-y — m-y is small for an administration in such a situation.
According to the comparative static results, unpopular governments have to
count on a less favorable outcome than stronger ones. In other words, the
probability of the Less treaty being adopted decreases when the distance
l\ — m.\ grows. By the same token, the undesirable outcomes (exit and back
down) become more likely. This is most likely one reason why Prime Minister
Thatcher had relatively little success with her opposition against monetary
integration. The integrationist governments knew that her fierce course was
largely determined by popularity considerations.
Another possibility is that the image of the "Iron Lady" lost credibility over
time. A weak laggard can try to build a reputation for toughness if the situation
does not change dramatically over time. Such behavior might increase the
integrationist's prior belief p of encountering a strong laggard. The weak
laggard faces the trade-off between accepting the less desirable More treaty
immediately and trying to improve the outcome by pushing for the Less treaty.
However, it can only obtain that treaty at the risk of having the bluff called. Asp
is tuned upward, the chances of obtaining the Less treaty are enhanced, but
simultaneously the probability of being forced to back down increases. The
strong laggard, by contrast, only is able to control the outcomes by changing the
cost parameter.
73. Valery Giscard d'Estaing, Le Pouvoir et la vie (Power and life), vol. 1 (Paris: CIE Douze,
1988), p. 150.
74. Butler, Europe, p. 69.
75. Christopher Tugendhat, Making Sense of Europe (London: Viking, 1986), p. 121.
76. Valery Giscard d'Estaing, Le Pouvoir et la vie (Power and Life), vol. 2 (Paris: CIE Douze,
1991), p. 463.
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Walk out.
Laggard^
Back down
Demand M / - " " ^ \ Do not ratify ^ dl-f-c,d2
Demand
Laggard*
Do not ratify / * d\ ~f' d2
Accept M ^ \ ^ ^
Ratify
FIGURE 3. The ratification game, where dj and d2 = respective negotiation
payoffs (i.e., status quo) for the laggard and the integrationist andf = the
punishment costs for failed ratification (for definitions of other variables, see
previous figures)
Ratification and takeover threats
Besides threatening to leave the organization, governments can use ratifica-
tion and takeover threats. The consequences of these manipulations are not as
drastic as those of an exit threat. In both the ratification and takeover games,
the threat's execution results in negotiation failure. Since the laggard remains a
member of the organization, the status quo prevails in these situations. This
kind of stalemate becomes possible when a strong laggard is not satisfied with
the counteroffer by the integrationist and responds with a walkout from a
summit. This player is forced to execute its threat since neither the electorate
(ratification game) nor the intraparty opposition (takeover game) would
approve of a More treaty.
The ratification game. Figure 3 depicts the ratification game, in which the
integrationist government is uncertain about the attitude of the domestic
constituency in the laggard state. In contrast to Figure 2, Nature moves only
after the players. This is more intuitive since the intergovernmental negotia-
tions always precede the ratification.77 As in the exit game, the laggard's first
choice is between accepting the More treaty and demanding the Less treaty.
The integrationist decides whether to accept or reject this offer. If this second
77. The game can easily be transformed into one in which Nature moves first by using the
Harsanyi transformation. See, for instance, Rasmussen, Games and Information, pp. 43-66.
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government insists on obtaining the More treaty, the laggard is forced either to
walk out from the negotiations or to back down. The novel feature of this game
is the ratification stage following any international agreement. Owing to our
assumption that the domestic constituents always accept a Less treaty, we do
not display the ratification move after the integrationist accepts this treaty. The
other ratification moves, however, are depicted as chance moves.
We keep the same notation for the payoffs, except for the case of
disagreement. In the ratification game, this contingency corresponds to the
status quo rather than to exit from the organization. We denote the payoffs
from this kind of negotiation deadlock as dx and d2. The second important
difference between the exit and ratification games is the increase in costs: if the
strong laggard accepts a More treaty but cannot garner domestic support for it,
the government receives a punishment / for the failed ratification; and, if the
laggard is forced to back down, cost c of losing face is applied. Thus, in the
event that the strong type subjects a More treaty to ratification, it could count
on the payoffs d\ — f — c and d\ — f, respectively.
The resulting preference orders are summarized in the following two
assumptions:
ASSUMPTION 3. d, - / - c < ds - f < d, < m, - c < m, < I,
ASSUMPTION 4. d2 < l2 < m2
Under complete information, the effects of a ratification threat correspond
to the implications of an exit threat. Integration negotiations thus follow the
functionalist prediction, with the strong laggard always obtaining the Less
treaty and the weak one immediately succumbing to the More treaty. The
suboptimal outcome of a walkout from negotiation never occurs unless there is
uncertainty about the attitude of the domestic constituents in the laggard's
country. The resulting deadlock situations are very common in the history of
the EC. Prime Minister Wilson successfully used a ratification threat in
combination with an exit threat as the Labour government subjected British
membership to a popular referendum. On the eve of the Paris summit in
December 1974, he said: "If renegotiations do not succeed, we shall not regard
the treaty obligations as binding upon us. We shall then put to the British
people the reasons why we find the new terms unacceptable, and consult them
on the advisability of negotiating our withdrawal from the Communities."78
Both Ireland and Denmark possibly could benefit by employing referendum
threats. The Irish constitution requires a referendum on constitutional amend-
ments such as the SEA and the Maastricht treaty. The Danish referendum
tradition and the lack of parliamentary support contributed to its rather timid
bargaining stance during SEA negotiations when the Conservative-led govern-
78. Harold Wilson, Final Term (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979), p. 543.
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Walk out
Demand
Demand
Laggard
-1 - c, 02
- c,
Accept M
No takeover
m 2
FIGURE 4. 77ie takeover game, where o2 = the integrationist's payoff from
completion of a treaty with the laggard's former opposition and t = takeover costs
(for definitions of other variables, see previous figures)
ment opted for a position similar to that of Britain.79 As this unstable
government coalition could not count on support from the dominant Social
Democrats in the Folketing (National Parliament), it decided to hold a
referendum on the SEA even though a popular vote was not constitutionally
required. The fear of a second failure after the initial rejection of the
Maastricht agreement contributed to the EC's generosity toward the small
Scandinavian member during negotiations over possible opt-outs from the
Maastricht treaty.
A more detailed analysis of the game shows that the punishment for a
ratification failure (/) does not influence the likelihood of the possible
outcomes. However, the possibility of such penalties enables weak laggards to
bluff and forces strong laggards to issue threats. There is ample evidence for
our assumption that it is very costly to lose a ratification. The most significant
example is Norway; the voters' rejection of European Economic Community
membership in 1972 had dramatic ramifications, including the resignation of
the government and the reshaping of party alliances.
The takeover game. A laggard may also employ takeover threats to reach a
more favorable treaty. As depicted in Figure 4, it can demand the Less treaty by
threatening that the More treaty would provoke takeover by a less-integration-
minded domestic opposition. If such a takeover happens, the integrationist
could expect the payoff o2 for the conclusion of the treaty with the opposition.
79. Garrett, "International Cooperation and Institutional Choice," p. 543.
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In contrast to the ratification game, the strong laggard's acceptance of the
More treaty incurs takeover cost t. This punishment can be measured in terms
of the popularity losses suffered by the resigning government. The preference
assumptions are as follows:
ASSUMPTION 5.d, - t - c < d, - t < d, < m, - c < m, < I,
ASSUMPTION 6. d2 < o2 < h < m2 or o2 < d2 < l2 < m2
Under complete information, the strong laggard again obtains a Less treaty,
while the weak laggard acquiesces to the More treaty. The strong laggard could
furthermore walk out from the negotiations if the integrationist erroneously
refused to yield the Less treaty. The reasons for a bargaining breakdown differ
from those in the ratification game. Here, the higher the payoff the integration-
ist attributes to a treaty with the opposition, the less likely the success of a bluff.
In the realm of the EU, British governments have been successful in
exploiting intraparty opposition to gain international bargaining leverage. If
the main opposition is a faction favoring further integration, takeover threats
are not credible. Opposition by more integration-minded Conservative mem-
bers of Parliament contributed to the relatively weak negotiation position of
Prime Minister Thatcher for the SEA. Ironically, her stubbornness in integra-
tion matters finally forced her out of power. The laggard of the 1980s was
brought down by a revolt led by her foreign secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, who
protested Thatcher's opposition to monetary integration.
Conclusion
As demonstrated above, regional integration follows a much less predictable
pattern than traditional realist or functionalist theories expect. Our explana-
tion is not the only one to deviate from the determinism of those approaches. In
contrast to other alternatives, however, our information-based argument
accounts for the effects of strategic bargaining on the integration process. In
particular, our models enhance our understanding of how uncertainty about
domestic conditions can be exploited by leaders seeking to improve the terms
of an integration agreement. The presence of information asymmetries opens
the door for strategic manipulation involving threats and signals. In contrast to
functionalist predictions, these moves may cause the integration process to stall
despite a desire on the part of all actors to reach an agreement. This
observation highlights interesting parallels to structurally similar situations. In
international crises, for instance, nations go to war despite their preference for
peace.80
80. See Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory; and Fearon, "Deterrence and the Spiral Model."
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According to our framework, the change of tide in political cooperation
depends on three conditions: first, all members of an organization (like the EC)
prefer some increase in integration. Second, they have to disagree about the
extent of cooperation. Third, there must be an informational asymmetry
between the negotiators. The stop-and-go logic will be a typical feature of
European integration as long as both intergovernmentalism and unanimity
characterize all major decisions.81
Although we found suggestive evidence for the presence of private informa-
tion, more systematic research is called for. Two related questions are central
in this respect: first, under what conditions do information asymmetries arise
outside the security realm? Second, how successful have leaders been in
exploiting such contingencies? Attempts to answer these questions should not
be limited to European integration but would benefit from a wider empirical
focus including international negotiations in various issue-areas.
The main purpose of this article has been to solve an important puzzle with
the help of some powerful analytic tools that, to our knowledge, have not been
applied to regional integration theory before. This does not mean, however,
that we believe incomplete information modeling to be a panacea. We must be
cautious for several reasons. Our framework represents a simplification of
reality along at least three dimensions. First, our models include only one-sided
incomplete information. In a more realistic setting, the integrationist can profit
from uncertainty by issuing threats to counter the bargaining tactics of the
laggard. For instance, an integration-minded government might use exclusion
tactics strategically to force a laggard to support an integration agreement.
Second, along the temporal dimension, our model is limited to disconnected
one-shot bargains. This allows us to analyze the impact of situational variables
but not of reputation building. Fortunately, our models could be extended to
capture this feature. For an analysis of the long-term dynamics, however,
evolutionary approaches offer the most fruitful ground for theory building.82
Finally, our model fails to address the spatial dimension explicitly despite its
centrality in regional integration. Important factors such as subsidiarity,
sovereignty, nationalism, and immigration cannot be understood without
reference to the territorial aspect of international politics.83
81. Under majority voting, political integration could become a smoother process than predicted
by our theory. In particular, there will be fewer chances for laggards to stall the negotiations.
Spatial models analyzing effects of qualified majority voting include George Tsebelis, "The Power
of the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter," American Political Science Review,
forthcoming; and Gerald Schneider, "The Limits of Self-Reform: Institution Building in the
European Union," typescript, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva.
82. For alternative formal approaches, see Michael T. Hannan and John Freeman, Organiza-
tional Ecology (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989); or Richard R. Nelson and
Sidney G. Winter, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1982).
83. Such factors are analyzed in Michael Don Ward, ed., The New Geopolitics (Philadelphia:
Gordon and Breach, 1992).
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Despite these limitations, we believe that our results can contribute to
current theory of regional integration. Formal reasoning of this type can
improve understanding of counterintuitive effects that may be hard to
recognize with verbal analysis. Under the assumption of integrationist prefer-
ences, the functionalist expectation of further formal cooperation was only
confirmed in a world of certainty. In the case of incomplete information, this
prediction turned out to be overly optimistic. This result should alert students
of international cooperation to the importance of strategic behavior in general
and the possibility of the manipulation of uncertainty in particular.
Appendix: the exit game
This appendix presents the proofs of propositions 1 and 2. To facilitate the calculations,
we denote the likelihood that the strong laggard chooses Demand L in the first move as
r. The corresponding probability for the weak laggard is s. The parameter q stands for
the probability that the integrationist demands the More treaty. Finally, we call the
posterior belief p'. We will often refer to the strong laggard as player 1, its weak
counterpart as player 1', and the integrationist as player 2.
We derive the universally divine equilibria for the exit game. This solution concept is a
refinement of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). Under complete information,
this latter equilibrium coincides with the simpler subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). It
is useful to note that a 4-tuple (r ,s,q,p') fully defines the equilibria:
LEMMA. We can reduce the game by excluding dominated strategies: (i) the strong laggard's
threat is credible, i.e., the second move of this player is always Exit; (ii) the weak laggard's
threat is incredible, i.e., the second move of this player is always Back down; and (Hi) ifs > 0
then r = 1 and q ^ 1.
Proof. The two first parts of the lemma follow directly from the definition of the types in
assumption 1, because U\ (Exit) > U\ (Back down) and Uy (Exit) < Uy (Back down).
We use these results to prove the last claim (iii). Suppose the contrary, r < 1, which is
the same as U\ (Demand L) = q(e\ + 8) + (1 - q) l\ < U\ (Accept M) = m\.
Rearranging yields q > (/] - m\)l{l\ — e\ - 8). By assumption .s > 0, so we must have
Uy (Demand L) = q(m1 — c) + (1 - q) l\ > U r (Accept M) = mt or q < (l\ - m\)l
(\i - mi + c). Combining the two inequalities produces
/t - m , l l - m,
/j — e1 — 8 lx — mx-V c
After simplification we obtain e\ + 8 < m\ — c, which contradicts assumption 1. Thus,
for s > 0, it must be that r = 1. To see that q ^ 1, suppose the opposite, q = 1. But if the
integrationist always calls the bluff, the weak laggard would never advance beyond the
first move because this step would lead to the inferior outcome m\- c , rather than mx,
for accepting the More treaty immediately. In this case, 5 = 0, which contradicts the
initial claim iii of the lemma, that 5 > 0. In other words, for 5 > 0 we know that
q* 1. •
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Now we are ready to derive the equilibria for the complete information game, i.e., for
bothp = 0 and/? = 1. Note that the certainty corresponds to being either in the upper or
lower part of the game tree.
PROPOSITION 1. Under complete information, the exit game has two SPEs. Equilibrium 1:
If the integrationist is certain to encounter the weak laggard (p — 0), the latter always
acquiesces, resulting in the More treaty (s = 0, q = 1; p' = 0). Equilibrium 2: If the
integrationist is certain to encounter the strong laggard (p = I), the latter demands the Less
treaty followed by the integrationist's acceptance of this treaty (r = 1; q = 0;p' = 1).
We derive the SPEs by backward induction.
Proof of equilibrium 1. If the integrationist is certain to encounter the weak laggard
(i.e., p = 0), it will choose Demand M, since this type always backs down (q = 1). In
formal terms, U2 (Demand M) = m2 > U2 (Accept L) = l2. Consequently, the weak
laggard prefers Accept M instead of pushing ahead with Demand L (s = 0): Uv (Accept
M) = m1 > Uy (Demand L) = mx - c. Thus, we conclude that the outcome must be the
More treaty.
Proof of equilibrium 2. By contrast, if player 2 knows that it is in the upper node in the
information set (p = 1), it chooses to accept the Less treaty since by assumption 2, U2
(Accept L) = l2 > U2 (Demand M) = e2. This implies q = 0. Anticipating this
opportunity, the laggard opts for Demand L in the first move (r = 1), since U\ (Accept
M) = Wj < U\ (Demand L) = l\. In this case, the outcome is the Less treaty. •
Having established the complete information equilibria, we turn to the uncertain
case. To derive the outcomes in the second proposition, we employ a refinement of the
PBE, namely, universal divinity.84
PROPOSITION 2. Under incomplete information, the exit game has two major cases and
one minor case. Equilibrium 1: If 0 < p < po, the PBE is partly pooling, described by the
behavior strategies r, s, and q and the integrationist'sposterior belief p' such that r = \,s =
P(h ~ e2)l{\ ~p)(m2 - I2),q = (lx - m{)l(k - m, + c), and/?' = p0 = (m2 - l2)/(m2 -
e2). This equilibrium collapses under the knife-edge condition p = p0. We thus find a pooling
equilibrium, equilibrium V, such that r = 1, s = 1, 0 < q < (l\ — m\)l{l\ — m\ + c), and
P' ~ P ~ Po- Equilibrium 2: Ifp0 < p < 1, we obtain another pooling equilibrium; hence,
r = 1, s = 1, q = 0, andp' = p.
Proof. We prove the proposition by considering all candidate equilibria. This amounts
to checking whether each strategy-belief combination (r, s,q,p') satisfies the condition
for a PBE. Given the strategies, the posterior belief/?' must therefore obey Bayes's rule.
The strategies must also be each others' best replies for a given belief.
It is convenient to study different values of s. First, suppose that the weak laggard
randomizes its first move: 0 < 5 < 1. Then, this player must be indifferent between
Accept M and Demand L in the first move:
Ur (Demand L) = q(mx - c) + (/ - q)l{ = Ur (Accept M) = mx.
84. Jeffrey Banks and Joel Sobel, "Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games," Econometrica 55
(May 1987), pp. 890-904.
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300028332
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 22:15:43, subject to the Cambridge Core
660 International Organization
Solving for q yields
_ l\ ~ mi
/, - m, + c '
Since 0 < q < 1 by assumption 1, the integrationist also mixes its strategy. From claim
(iii) of the lemma we know that r = 1, which fixes all the strategies. It remains to be
proven whether the posterior belief/"' is consistent. We already have shown that the
integrationist uses a mixed strategy, so it must be that
[/2(Demand M) =p'e2 + (1 - p')m2 = £/2(Accept L) = l2. (Al)
Using this equation, we determine/)':
m2 ~ h
In PBE, Bayes's rule must hold, which gives us a second expression for/?':
Pr P
( A 3 )
Equations A2 and A3 allow us to extract an expression for s:
P h ~ e2
s^f- j . (A4)
I — p m2 - l2
We have already constrained J to satisfy 0 < s < 1. This inequality is equivalent to 0 <
p < p0, which defines case 1. Hence, we have found the first PBE.
Proceeding to the second case, we assume that s = 1. As requirement iii of the lemma
applies, we know that r = 1. Since there is no behavioral difference between the two
types in the first move, no updating takes place (that is,/)' = p). The equilibrium must be
pooling under these conditions. Claim iii of the Lemma also shows that q ^ 1, reducing
the integrationist's strategies to two possibilities: 0 < q < 1 and q = 0. In the former
case, equation Al holds, fixing/) =/?' =p0. This is nothing but the pooling equilibrium in
the knife-edge equilibrium 1', separating equilibrium 1 from equilibrium 2. The latter
case (q = 0), however, implies that U2 (Accept L) > U2 (Demand M). This simplifies to
Po < P — p' < 1> thus setting the boundaries of the pooling equilibrium in case 2.
We have as yet not analyzed the contingency s = 0. Under this assumption,
requirement iii of the lemma does not apply. As a consequence we need to consider all
possible values of r. Suppose, first, that r > 0. In this case, we can apply Bayes's rule to
calculate the posterior belief />' = pr/\pr + (1 — p)s] = pr/pr = 1. But if the
integrationist is certain to be in the upper node of the information set, it will surely play
Accept L, or q = 0. Anticipating this move, the weak laggard has an incentive to exploit
the situation by playing Demand L since l\ > m,. As this result contradicts the
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300028332
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 22:15:43, subject to the Cambridge Core
European integration 661
TABLE Al. Summary of the equilibria of propositions 1 and 2 (the exit game)
Prior
belief
r
s
q
P'
Pr(M)
Pr(M')
Pr(L)
Pr(£)
Complete
information
—
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
Incomplete information
Casel
(0 < p < p0)
1
P h ~ ?2
1 -pm2-l2
h -mi
ll - mt + c
m2 — l2
P" m2-e2
x-p-
Po
l2 -e2 l i - mi
11 m2 - l2li - mi + i
P c
Poh ~ mt+c
h -mi
P li - mi + c
0 <
Po •
h-
c m2
h~
Po,
Case V
(P =Po)
1
1
h -mi
• H " h - mi + c
m2 — l2
m2 — e2
0
-e2 l i - mi
— e2li — mi + c
c
- mi + c
h -mi
i-mi + c
Case 2
(Po <P < V
1
1
0
P
0
0
1
0
Complete
information
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
assumption s = 0, the combination cannot be a PBE. Only one possibility remains,
namely, that r = 0.
Finally, we need to consider the possibility that both s = 0 and r = 0. The problem
with this strategy combination is that player 2's information set cannot be reached,
excluding the use of Bayes's rule for the derivation of p'. This case, however, can be
discarded by constraining the out-of-equilibrium belief with the help of the universal
divinity criterion or, more precisely, the weaker "Dl criterion."85 This refinement
requires that whenever the weak laggard weakly prefers to defect from the equilibrium,
the strong laggard strictly prefers to deviate. If this holds, we know that the
integrationist has to place zero belief on encountering the weak laggard, since the strong
laggard is "more likely" to deviate from the equilibrium than the weak laggard.
Formally, if for all q such that Uy (Accept M) < Uy (Demand L), we have U\ (Accept
M) < Ux (Demand L), then the Dl criterion implies 1 — p' = 0 orp' = 1. But we know
that this condition holds, because nti < q (mi - c) + (1 —q) li always implies my < q
(ex + 8) + (1 — q)li, by assumption 1. Thus, it must be that/?' = 1. However, from above
85. Banks, Signaling Games in Political Science, pp. 16-17.
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we know that p' = 1 violates the assumption s = 0. Consequently, the strategy
combination r = 0, s = 0 can be ruled out by appealing to the Dl criterion. Obviously,
this criterion also holds for all nonzero beliefs.
Having exhausted all strategy-belief combinations, we have proved that the equilibria
of the proposition are not only PBE but also unique. •
Some of the alternative equilibrium refinements are not restrictive enough to discard
the out-of-equilibrium belief in the exit game.86 For example, the weaker intuitive
criterion does not rule out the r = s = 0 equilibrium, because there are best responses q
by the integrationist such that the weak laggard has an incentive to deviate from the
equilibrium strategy (i.e., s > 0). It should be noted that the idea of equilibrium
refinements is a controversial subject in the theoretical literature.87
Table Al presents a summary of the results for propositions 1 and 2. The lower part of
the table also contains the probabilities of the outcomes for each equilibrium. The
outcomes are denoted as follows. While Pr(M) represents the probability of the
laggard's immediate acceptance of the More treaty, Pr(M') corresponds to the
probability of the same outcome, but only after this actor has backed down. The
likelihood of the two remaining outcomes is Pr(L) for the Less treaty and Pr(£) for exit.
The outcome probabilities are easily calculated as a product of the probability of the
branches leading to each outcome:
P h ~ e2 \ „ m2 - e2 p
2 P0
Pr(M) = (l -p)(l-s) = (l-p)\l -j1 r = 1 -p r = 1 - -
v ' x t/y ' v ' \ l—pm2 — l2j m2 — l
h - e2 /] — ml
Pr (M') = (1 — p) sq = p
m2 — l2ll—ml+c
Pr (L) = p(l — q\+ (1 — p) s(l — q) = \p + (1 — p)s](l - q)
e2-l2 c
= P]
Pr(E)=pq=p
m2 - hi \ lx-mx+cl l2 - m2lx - mx + c p0lx - mx
86. Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole, Game Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991),
chap. 11.
87. See Ken Binmore, Essays on the Foundation of Game Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: Basil
Blackwell, 1990); and David M. Kreps, A Course in Microeconomic Theory (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 437.
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